



A few months ago the Court of Appeals of New York handed
down a decision which attracted some attention at the time, not
so much because of the conclusions reached, as for the historical
review in it of a well settled though, perhaps-to the layman-
unfamiliar doctrine of law.
The facts of the case are not material to this paper and may
be omitted. The point discussed was whether a man who, with-
out any formalities whatever, had adopted an entirely new name
for himself and had been known and called by the artificial desig-
nation for many years, was justified in declaring that to be his
true name.
The court, after outlining the origin and history of proper
names, held that the man in question was entirely within his
rights. Moreover, it was decided that a New York statute which
provides certain simple machinery by which one may apply
through the courts to change his name is not a limitation upon the
common law right, but a supplement to it. In other words, the
statutory proceeding simply fixes a date upon which the transfer
goes into effect, whereas by the informal method a person would
have to "grow into" the new designation, as it were.
One hesitates to suggest new fields for legislation as, in eco-
nomic terms, we are suffering from an overproduction of statutes
and the desire of the judicious is to see a stoppage of the presses
rather than an increased activity. Nevertheless, it may be said
colloquially that, so far as subjects are concerned, the body of
statutory law resembles a boarding house mattress, with lumps in
one place, depressions in another. And while one admirable ob-
ject of reform is to plane away the hillocks of excessive regula-
tion, it is not improper to direct attention to holes that might
be filled.
There is not the slightest doubt that the decision of the New
York court was correct upon the law as it stands to-day. By
the common law of England a man was entitled to adopt a new
name for himself as one changes a coat. "A man," says one
authority, "may lawfully change his name, or by general use or
habit acquire another name than that originally borne by him, and
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this without the intervention of either the sovereign, the Courts or
Parliament." ' Moreover, the privilege included not only the
divesting himself of his former cognomen, but the selection of
any other, even though the new was already borne by some one
else. "At common law," observed the court in an English case,
"there is no property right in any person to the use of a particu-
lar name as a surname, to the extent of enabling him to prevent
the assumption of the same name by another person." 
2
This laissez faire attitude in Great Britain is explained his-
torically by the fact that only within the last few centuries have
proper names acquired any hereditary character among the
"common people." The New York court, in the case already re-
ferred to, cited from Camden's Remains an instance of a family
in which a father and eight sons all had different surnames. And
to this day there are said to exist in remote districts people with
only one name and that not a family name.
Such a condition of affairs is entirely comprehensible when it
exists among a people, simple, rude, and illiterate, living, dying
and having all of their interests limited to the narrow com-
munities in which they dwell. Names for them would serve
merely as ready means of identification, like trade-marks to-day on
goods. Indeed, the inhabitants of remote and primitive districts
in this country, such as are found in the northern Maine woods,
sometimes know one another as "John," or "Bill," only and do not
know the family names belonging to them.
Then this informality would be rendered still more innocuous
in Great Britain by two other considerations that are fairly obvi-
ous. In the first place individuals raised to the peerage and given
the choice of names have always had an inducement to select a
designation not borne by others. It is a badge of distinction and
a clashing avoided through this reason alone. Secondly, so far
as the lower classes are concerned, in such an extremely homo-
geneous land where, out of 37,000,000 inhabitants, only about
3ooo0, are foreigners, practically the sole undesirable result of
such changes is a confusion of individual and not race identity.
If a man whose father was named Smith prefers to be known as
Brown, there is perhaps no particular reason why he should not
gratify his taste; however much he may thus complicate genealog-
ical records.
'Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd ed.), vol. 21, p. 311.
2 Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, L. R.. 2 P. C., 430.
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In short, such importance as proper names have, accrues only
as civilization becomes complex, with a greatly increased mingling
of people, the multiplication of written records, and the growing
necessity for preserving identities.
Now, it is a familiar fact that the common law of England
was transferred bodily to this country and its doctrines obtain
wherever they have not been abrogated by statute. But the most
casual reflection will suggest the presence of considerations, as
far as names are concerned, differing from any that existed in
the older country. This is not a homogeneous nation, but a vast
congeries of diverse races, drawn from every quarter of the earth,
nearly one-half being foreign born or of foreign parentage. One
of the consequences is that referred to in the preceding paragraph,
namely, the increased significance of proper names. With the
advancing complexity of society and means of tiansportation,
communities have become more fluid. Men no longer live and
die where they were born, but move here, there and everywhere
as opportunities for improving their condition appear. But also
we are brought more and more closely into contact with those by
whom we are surrounded and when, as new arrivals, it is more
difficult to learn who and what they are, any items of information
that may be gleaned are of value.
Now, under such circumstances, the name is one of the first
and most obvious things that occur. And hence, as was said,
they have come, unconsciously perhaps, to have increasing im-
portance in our sight. A very familiar illustration of one aspect
of this fact is found in the way we associate names with racial
skill and capacity to an extent probably known nowhere else in
the world. English names are at a premium for tailors and boot-
makers, French for milliners, Spanish for cigarmakers, and
Oriental for carpets and rugs. While socially the names peculiar
to the stocks, Anglo-Saxon, Dutch and Huguenot, that founded
the nation and still predominate command a prestige that is un-
deniable. Moreover, this advantage inheres not so much in any
one name as in the sound. It is the suggestion of race affiliation
that counts, not the belonging to one particular branch of family.
Such being the case, it is interesting to note the lines along
which the unrestricted right has been utilized in the United States.
Although the statement of the common law rule was that anyone
had the privilege of assuming a name for himself, in practice the
new .designation was at one time frequently assigned to him by
his neighbors. expressive of some peculiarity either physical, as
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Long, Short, or Strong, or mental, as Bright, Wiley, and Gay.
Very often it referred to the occupation of the man, as Butler,
Carpenter, or Smith. These are merely samples of a multitude
of considerations that governed the matter.
Among us, however, this custom is absolutely non-existent and
with the exception of' sporadic instances of change in order to
acquire an inheritance or for some similar reason, as Edmund
Fiske Green became John Fiske, the historian, the right seems
to be invoked chiefly by aliens to blot out the evidence of race
origin which their former designations supplied.
There is no available method of determining to what extent
the informal common law method of transformation has been
applied because such changes would not be matters of public
record. But when foreigners have chosen to avail themselves of
the statutory procedure the information is preserved. And an
inspection of any volume of the Session Laws of New York
State alone reveals the fact that a widespread racial metamor-
phosis in this respect is under way.
As illustrations, a few picked at random from one or two vol-
umes may be given, although they might be multiplied a thou-
sand fold. Kuschewsky has become Kaye; Jacobowitz, Palmer;
Poznanski, Postley; Staroselsky, Starr; Marschawsky, Ward;
Schlimowitz, Wilson; Kaminowsky, Bennett; Botkowsky, Butler;
Dabrocryriskie, Davis; Campodonica, Martin; Novinsky, Nevins;
Smusovitz, Phillips; Sausersig, Seymour; and- Cidkowski, Syd-
ney. While some names, such as Morris, Harris, and the sturdy
Gordon, have been appropriated so widely by aliens that their
original savor has well-nigh disappeared.
Renan has a caustic comment on the old Christian legend of
the Saint who, when threatened by a lion, resorted to prayer,
whereupon a sheep kindly appeared and was devoured, while
the holy man made his escape. Where, asked Renan, was the jus-
tice to the sheep? And so, while sympathizing with those whose
birth names are harsh or even grotesque, we might ask whether
it is just to the bearers of honored cognomens to permit such easy
misappropriations to continue indefinitely. The motive must be
frequently that alluded to above, namely, the desire to obtain an
added prestige by assuming a designation that is not only euphon-
ious, but is already associated in the public mind with honorable
living and high endeavor. Moreover, one may doubt the wisdom,
as a practical matter, of permitting a destruction of the evidences
of race origin.' As data for the study of criminology are collected
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with greater and greater care, it becomes increasingly important
that such lines of research should be kept open and not obliterated.
At least it seems only proper that aliens desiring to discard their
inheritance of consonants should be limited as far as possible to
names coined by themselves or the State for the purpose and not
be permitted to seize upon those that suit them rather less than
would Highland kilts a gang of Italian navvies.
There is nothing new or radical in this because the lack of regu-
lation disappears as soon as we leave the domain of "proper
names"--as we employ that term. The Post Office Department
will not permit a new town to adopt a name already used by an-
other, and the writer was told recently of one village which
wanted a post office and tried thirty-seven names before one was
found acceptable to the authorities. Corporations are absolutely
prohibited from taking names already pre-empted. Indeed, in
mercantile affairs, where finahicial considerations prevail, the con-
fusion and unfair advantage that such looseness would produce
were recognized long ago and proper restrictions imposed. As
far back as 1833 an act was passed by the Legislature of the
State of New York, preventing a man from doing business under
any other than his real name, nor may one adopt a trade name for
himself or his goods which is liable to be confused with that of
someone else who has long used it and to whom it is a valuable
asset.
It is true, of course, that these provisions have been established
for purely "practical" reasons, while their extension would have
to be based largely upon sentimental grounds. Yet there is much
in the consideration that a "good name" inherited, is an ideal to
live up to-at a time especially when all worthy ideals should be
encouraged-while if adopted merely it is apt to be rated only
according to its social or commercial value.
Then, too, sentiment and the practical have many points of con-
tact. Public parks, broad streets, buildings restricted in height,
may have been advocated once solely on aesthetic grounds. But
to-day we realize their vital bearing upon public health and morals.
and proper names may eontain more than we think. "To review
the sources of a people's nomenclature," observed Mr. Bardsley,
in his book on English Surnames, "is to review the people's his-
tory. When we remember that there is nothing without a name,
and that every name that is named, whether it be of a man, or
man's work, or man's heritage of earth, came not by chance, or
accident, so-called, but was given out of some nation's spoken
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language to denote some characteristic that language possessed,
we can readily imagine how important is the drift of each-what
a record must each contain."
The suggested limitation then is tivofold: First-That a man
be prohibited from divesting himself of his baptismal name with-
out making the matter one of public record. Secondly-That he
be not allowed to assume a name already borne by others, but
be compelled to coin one, by translation, as the German Sch6n-
berg -was changed to the French Belmont, or by an arbitrary
assemblage of letters as cable code names are devised. Possibly
it would be practicable for the State to establish a table of artifi-
cial names, any one of which might be selected by an aspirant for
euphony.
At least this may be said. Many prophets declare that the
races which founded and developed this country are hurrying to
extinction. If it be so, they may, without undue selfishness, ask
the privilege of carrying to oblivion the peculiar heritage of
names, as their predecessors, the Indian braves, were buried with
the adornments they possessed in life.
New York City. Frederick Dwight.
